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A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
COMPENSATION FOR HARM: EXAMINING THE
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
Tom R. Tyler and Hulda Thorisdottir*
INTRODUCTION
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 (the
Fund)' established after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
poses a challenge to authorities due to the highly unusual circum-
stances for which the Fund was created. The goal of this Article is to
argue that this challenge neither should nor can be met by directly
applying conventional legal standards developed for tort cases, but
rather that these legal approaches need to be supplemented by taking
into account what is known about the psychology of harm and justice.
We will argue that the Fund has three important characteristics.
First, the authorities who established the Fund are not those who
caused the harm for which the Fund is providing compensation, and
thus, the true perpetrators are not taking blame for the attacks. Sec-
ond, the Fund involves considerably higher levels of compensation
than has been seen in similar cases such as in the Oklahoma City
Bombing, but fails to give clear standards for how that compensation
should be awarded. Third, the amounts of compensation were de-
cided upon without procedures such as trials, hearings, or fact-finding
commissions.
II. DISCONTENT WITH THE FUND AS SEEN THROUGH THE MEDIA
By establishing the Fund only ten days after the terrorist attacks,
Congress made a quick response to a major public event and, by many
measures, a generous one. Despite this, it is subsequently becoming
increasingly clear that relatives of deceased victims have a number of
grievances regarding the Fund, and that the Fund has led to wide-
* Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, Room 550, New
York, New York 10003. We would like to thank Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Angelina Davis,
Celia Gonzalez, Marlone Henderson, Ayelet Kattan, Yephat Kivetz, Crystal Matsibekker, and
Cheryl Wakslak for comments on this Article.
1. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002)
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)) [hereinafter September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of
2001].
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spread discontent, and even defiance and litigation, by those it was
designed to aid. 2 This discontent was predicted by some and has been
subject to media coverage in the nation's leading journals and newspa-
pers that in many ways has supported the relatives' views.3
The first version of the rules for the Fund was criticized by politi-
cians and families for being stingy, but that criticism was addressed in
the second version of the rules.4 It was evident, however, by June
2002, that the rate of applications to the Fund was slow.5 Out of the
3,000 families eligible at that time, fewer than ten had filed a complete
application, and around 500 had filed a partial application missing cru-
cial information, such as information about salary from employers. 6
The slow pace of applications created suspicions that people might
actually plan not to apply to the Fund and would file a lawsuit instead.
Indeed, by September 2002, more families had signed up for lawsuits
than for government relief.7
Various explanations have been given for the slow pace of applica-
tions. Some families said that they were "not emotionally ready to
translate personal devastations into actuarial calculations."' 8 Others
complained that they found the thirty page application and the whole
procedure too complicated to figure out.9 A lawyer who represents
fifty families said that people did not believe the process would be
fair.10 People also said they felt the Fund was a "shut up fund"11 and
that the government wanted to get this over with as fast as possible, in
order to sweep this ugly case under the rug.12 One woman who filed a
lawsuit against the airlines said that she found the concept of the Fund
offensive.1 3
The underlying grievances that started to grow by the time the first
version of the rules was announced in December 2001, and could be
seen developing in news stories, surfaced in three ways from Fall 2002
2. David W. Chen, Many Relatives, Wary and Anguished, Shun Sept. 11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2002, at B1.
3. Id. Michael I. Meyerson, Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, § 4 (week in
review), at 15; Amanda Ripley, Life and Worth?, TIME, Feb. 11, 2002, at 23.
4. Ripley, supra note 3, at 23-27; see also September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,
supra note 1, for the second set of rules.
5. Chen, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr, Business World: How Much Do We Owe the 9-11 Victims?, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, at A15.
8. Ripley, supra note 3, at 26.
9. Chen, supra note 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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to January 2003. First, a widower launched a website 14 devoted to dis-
cussion about the alleged unfairness of the Fund and, in particular, to
the argument that its Special Master has treated the relatives and vic-
tims with a lack of respect. 15 The author of the website claims that the
Special Master has too much authority because he both makes the
rules and judges by them.1 6 He is also accused of not working accord-
ing to the intentions of Congress when the Fund was established.17
Second, the company Cantor Fitzgerald issued a detailed report
harshly critiquing the Fund. 18 Finally, seven families of victims who
worked for Cantor Fitzgerald sued the Special Master of the Fund
based on the report's findings.19
Despite these problems, Kenneth Feinberg, the Special Master for
the Fund, said that the deadline in December 2003 was still far away
and that he was confident that in the end ninety percent of families
would file a claim.20 Whatever ultimately happens, however, it seems
clear that the public level of resistance to the Fund has been higher
than was originally anticipated.
In this Article, we will argue that the aforementioned discontent
with the Fund stems, to a large extent, from the fact that authorities
failed to consider the psychology of justice and compensation for
harm when establishing the Fund and creating its rules. We will dis-
cuss how some of the discontent could have been prevented and how
some was probably inevitable due to the nature of the circumstances.
In Part III, we will discuss how people react to harm and, in particu-
lar, to harm that stems from immoral acts. We will argue that when
people have been victims of immoral harm they do not seek material
compensation, but instead look for an apology and for ways to restore
a moral balance. We will discuss how this poses a nearly insolvable
problem for authorities, in the case of the terrorist attacks, because
the true perpetrators are unreachable and no authority in the United
States is willing to take blame for the attacks.
14. See http://www.fixthefund.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2003). See also David W. Chen, Vic-
tims' Kin Find Fault with Overseer of 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at B1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Submission of Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P., Espeed, Inc. and Tradespark L.P. to the Special
Master of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 and to the United States
Department of Justice, available at http://www.cantorusa.comlbcf/DOJsubmission.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec. 9, 2003).
19. David W. Chen, 7 Families Sue Administrator of 9/11 Fund, NY TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at
B1.
20. Chen, supra note 2.
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Part IV discusses the problems posed by the fact that the Fund is
unprecedented in the arena of compensation for harm. We will argue
that because authorities probably failed to consider, and certainly
failed to explain to people, their rationale for how the rules were
structured, the Fund and its enabling legislation fails to create feelings
of distributive justice amongst the recipients of the Fund.
In Part V, we will argue that the Fund violates people's perceptions
of procedural fairness because the rules creating the Fund and the
amount of compensation given in individual decisions during imple-
mentation were determined without the use of mechanisms, such as
administrative hearings or other "procedurally fair" forums, for deter-
mining how the Fund should operate and how individual cases should
be resolved. This violation of procedural fairness has fueled a lack of
trust and confidence in the Fund and the Special Master.
In addressing each of these three questions, we will apply the results
of psychological research to an important legal issue. However, we
want to note that psychologists work to develop general models, while
legal scholars seek to address specific legal questions.21 Hence, to
some extent, our analysis must inevitably miss some of the nuances
and contextual complexities unique to this Fund and the tragedy it
was created to address. Nonetheless, we feel that there are important
insights that can be gained from taking such a psychological
perspective.
III. MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARM
A. Dealing with Issues of Moral Accountability is Important
The following are our main points about moral accountability:
(1) Money can compensate some harms. Other harms require com-
pensation through the allocation of moral responsibility to actors for
their actions. The September 11th attack was a type of harm that peo-
ple respond to by looking for moral accountability. As a result, peo-
ple were seeking to determine moral responsibility for the event;
(2) The Fund treats the terrorist attacks as the law would treat an
"accident" in that it focuses on providing compensation for harm as
do civil compensation models.22 Victims are more likely to view the
attack as an act of moral turpitude and a symbolic assault on America
and, therefore, seek accountability for the occurrence of the event;
21. CHARLES M. JUDD ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS (6th ed. 1991).
22. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES: RESEARCH
DESIGN AND METHODS (1991).
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(3) The actions of the government in establishing the Fund commu-
nicated ambiguous information about whether the government itself
was a suitable target for moral blame. On the one hand, the govern-
ment did not engage in the type of "fact finding hearings" that are
typically held after major disasters to identify those responsible for
the events, providing a target for the public's need to hold someone
accountable. 23 This prevented labeling some particular government
official(s) as careless or negligent, but fueled vague feelings that the
Fund was a "cover up" to compensate victims in exchange for not
publicly identifying the government authorities whose failures led to
the event.24 At the same time, the government itself implied that it
was responsible in some way for failing to prevent the tragedy from
occurring by compensating the victims because compensation typically
flows from feelings of responsibility for harm.25 Whatever the actual
motives for compensation, we normally think that people are more
likely to feel responsible to provide compensation when they acknowl-
edge some responsibility for the event. By stepping in and offering
compensation, the government invited some seeking accountability
for the events of September 11th to think that the government was
acknowledging that it did not exercise enough care in preventing the
tragedy. If the government was trying to protect the airlines, the same
logic holds. Unless the government felt that the airlines were in some
way responsible, why would it feel the need to shield them from scru-
tiny in a court of law?26 We normally think that innocence from
wrongdoing is a defense in court, so the actions of the government
support the inference that someone (possibly the airlines) was
negligent.
B. The Legal View of What People Want in Response to Harm
Legislators, as well as legal scholars, tend to assume that what peo-
ple want when they have been harmed is a fast solution that provides
them with a high level of material rewards-monetary compensa-
tion-or, at the very least, a "fair" monetary settlement.2 7 This as-
sumption is evident in how the Fund is structured.
It is true that when an individual or an organization causes harm to
others, we usually feel that the harm doer, or society, or both, should
23. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 15.
24. Id.
25. TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 103-32 (1997).
26. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 15.
27. Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Settlement of Mass Tort Claim, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (1990).
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take some action to make things right. While responses to harm doing
can take many forms, one of the most common types of response is for
the harm doer, or some other agent, to compensate the victim for any
damage, potentially including loss of income and pain and suffering.28
Compensation occurs when someone provides material resources,
such as money, in response to harm to others.29 People can often
make harms completely or partially "right" by some such forms of
material compensation.
However, psychological research has shown that people often think
beyond issues of the simple existence of, or amount of, compensation
to whether or not "justice is being done. ' 30 In other words, the psy-
chological perspective argues that issues of justice and ethics are often
the key to public feelings about responses to harm. Justice may or
may not be "done" when people are compensated, depending upon
the circumstances. Drawing from psychological research on justice,
we argue that the Fund, established following the events of September
11th, is lacking when evaluated against moral criterion, 31 and this fea-
ture of the plan helps us to understand why it has not been more en-
thusiastically received by its intended beneficiaries.
What we argue, in other words, is that this narrow legal view of
"what people want" captures only some, and perhaps not the most
important, elements of people's reactions to harms. We suggest that
there are many other factors that matter to people, at least as much as,
or even more than, monetary awards and quick solutions, and espe-
cially when the harm done is of the nature of the September 11th
attack.
C. Compensation for Harms
In some circumstances, harms are easily seen as being the conse-
quence of unintended "accidents. ' 32 In such cases, compensation
seems like a natural response to the victims of harm, and people who
have been compensated generally feel satisfied with this response to
their loss. With the many everyday accidents that occur in work set-
tings, there are procedures for compensation that are based on the
extent and nature of the harm-people are compensated for what
they have lost in terms of lost income, medical expenses, and the
28. ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 21-83 (1978).
29. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
30. Id.
31. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25.
32. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22; see also DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND
SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984).
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like.33 In other instances, however, material compensation is not con-
sidered an appropriate response.
People are less likely to find compensation acceptable in situations
when the harm involves issues of moral wrong-culpability on the
part of wrongdoers.34 In such a situation, the primary focus of vic-
tims, their families, and society more generally, is on bringing to ac-
count "responsible people. '35 In such settings, people are primarily
interested in receiving an apology and restoring social order and re-
spect, not in receiving monetary rewards. 36 This is not to suggest that
compensation is unimportant. Rather, it fails to address the key issue
on people's minds-moral accountability. 37
Studies make clear that when someone has broken the rules of soci-
ety and caused harm to another person, people want justice restored
by dealing with the moral failure of the rule breaker in some way.38
Most of the time simply compensating the victims is not considered
enough. For example, a bank robber cannot simply return the money
from a robbery and go free; society demands some type of additional
response. This response deals with the moral dimensions of the origi-
nal crime.
This interplay of moral and nonmoral motivations can also be found
in people's desire to punish criminal wrongdoers. 39 One reason why
people might want to punish those who commit crimes is to deter fu-
ture criminal conduct, both from the particular person involved as
well as from others.40 This would reflect a harm-based reaction to the
problem-a desire to minimize future negative consequences. From a
deterrence perspective, We should punish people in the way that best
deters their future criminal conduct and serves as a message that de-
ters the criminal conduct of others.
A second reason to punish wrongdoing is moral; the belief that
criminal actions create a moral imbalance that must be resolved. 41
33. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22.
34. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25.
35. Robert J. Boeckmann, An Alternative Conceptual Framework for Offense Evaluation:
Implications for a Social Maintenance Model of Retributive Justice (1996) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with University of Omaha, University
Library and University of California, Berkeley, Psychology Department).
36. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Expe-
rience in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 953 (1990).
37. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25.
38. Id.
39. Boeckmann, supra note 35.
40. Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002).
41. Id.
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Experimental studies varying the characteristics of crimes indicate the
great importance people attach to the second reason.4 2 The studies
show that the primary motivation guiding reactions to wrongdoing is
the motivation to restore a moral balance, not issues of deterrence.
4 3
So, for example, people punish someone who has done wrong even
when there is no likelihood that the wrongdoer can or will repeat that
action in the future.
We, thus, punish people, not primarily to deter them from future
crime, but to restore a moral balance among the harm doer, the vic-
tim, and society. Of course, in the case of the September 11th attack,
the immediate perpetrators were dead, but we believe that the, desire
to restore a moral balance remained, motivating people to search
more broadly for terrorist leaders and others who could be the focus
of an effort to seek accountability. Compensation for harm, in other
words, was unlikely to meet the psychological need to restore a moral
balance in this case. There were no harm doers to be punished, to
apologize, or to otherwise acknowledge the wrongness of their ac-
tions, but nonetheless compensation was, at best, a poor substitute for
the moral accountability that people were actually motivated to seek.
This inability to achieve a moral accounting leads to the inevitable
fact that even though victims are almost certainly not going to get
those responsible for the terrorist attacks to acknowledge wrongdoing
and apologize-not in court or anywhere else-compensation will not
feel as if it is a satisfying alternative. This inadequacy of compensa-
tion causes frustration, and people start to look elsewhere for a re-
sponsible party who can apologize, or at least be held accountable.
Some people blame the airlines and others the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Federal Bureau of Investigation for not being able to
foresee the events that unfolded.44 Whether actually responsible or
not, these groups have the psychological virtue of being available to
be confronted about the tragedy so accountability can be demanded
and pursued.
We suggest that one reason some people are reluctant to sign up for
the Fund, and are considering whether to sue either the airlines or the
Saudi-Arabian government, is that they are still hoping to get their
apology or acknowledgement of fault and responsibility from some
group or organization. This is much more important than a hope of
getting money by going to a trial. Hence, by buying into the Fund, we
argue that people feel they are losing their opportunity to eventually
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Ripley, supra note 3, at 26.
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confront those responsible, however unrealistic this future possibility
might actually be.
It might initially seem "far fetched" to hold the United States gov-
ernment responsible for the September 11th tragedy. However, the
government can be seen as encouraging this connection by setting up
the compensation fund. While it may be that the actual motivation for
the Fund was to help the airlines, many people do not connect the
Fund to the financial health of the airlines. Instead, we propose that
there is a natural suggestion in the creation of the Fund that the gov-
ernment must feel some responsibility for the event because it is com-
pensating victims.
We argue that it is plausible that the government feels responsible
because it acknowledges having the responsibility to find and stop
such attacks or, alternatively, because the government feels that
World Trade Center was an attack against society as a whole-a sym-
bolic response to government policies-and, hence, the government is
in some broader sense responsible for provoking this response.45 In
either case, the suggestion that the government is responsible leads to
public views that accountability is important.
People are more willing to believe that poor management, or even
negligence, has occurred when they lack trust in the character, mo-
tives, or intentions of the authorities with whom they are dealing.
Corporations, for example, suffer from low public confidence in their
leaders, resulting in a greater willingness to mistrust their actions be-
cause they are viewed as indifferent or uncaring. 46 Evidence from
public opinion polls points to a decline in trust in government, leaving
government authorities more open to similar types of "sinister"
attributions .47
D. Moral Harm to the Community
While we would generally argue that people do not accept compen-
sation as a complete response to intentional harm done by others,
there is a particular aspect of the attacks that works against the ac-
ceptance of compensation: The attacks were a symbolic attack against
American society, in addition to an attack on individuals.
45. Studies suggest that it is an event of just this type that is most likely to be viewed as calling
for a collective response. See Boeckmann, supra note 35.
46. VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (2000).
47. Id.
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According to a framework of wrongdoing developed by Robert J.
Boeckmann, 48 which is shown in Figure 1, compensation is least likely
to be viewed as a suitable response to symbolic attacks on society (i.e.,
attacks like the September 11th attack). Such symbolic attacks re-
quire "a moral" response. In fact, people both: (1) react most strongly
to a collective, symbolic, attack; and (2) are least likely to see restitu-
tion as a suitable response.
Who is the victim?
An individual Society
What is lost?
Material resources, Robbing someone Embezzling
Money of money government
Funds
Symbolic resources Slander, libel Defiling national
symbols;
violating
collective values
Figure 1. The nature of rule-breaking offenses (Boeckmann, 1996)
The attacks on September 11th caused all kinds of harm in addition
to being highly immoral. They hurt both individuals and society as a
whole. It was an attack on American values as well as an event that
caused a great deal of material and human loss. As a result, there is
not one single way to restore justice. Although money might compen-
sate for the loss of steady income, buildings, and businesses, people
feel that material compensation is not enough to restore justice and
resolve the moral issues involved. 49  But it does not make up for the
losses of loved ones or the insult to American society and its values,
which the attacks unquestionably were intended to target. It is the
attack on American society, in particular, that calls for some type of
moral accounting. 50
48. Boeckmann, supra note 35.
49. Id.
50. Interestingly, it is also the symbolic aspect of the attack that lends plausibility to the idea
that the government is responsible. There were earlier bombings and other types of attacks on
American soldiers and embassies. The government knew, in other words, about the threat to
America and could "in theory" be viewed as negligent for failing to do something to respond to
this threat. Such a view is certainly more realistic than thinking that the terrorists had something
against the particular people or companies in the World Trade Center. The World Trade Center
and its twin towers were important as symbols of American commercial power, rather than due
to any particular people or companies that were within it.
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E. The Need for a Moral Accounting
The immediate perpetrators of the attacks died in the attacks.51
However, the need for moral accountability remains. This need is ex-
pressed in the desire to search for those who funded, trained, or
guided the attack. And the government responded to this need by
making efforts to find and punish members of the groups behind the
attack.52 It is hard to fault the government, which has gone to Af-
ghanistan and Iraq to root out terrorists, for lack of effort to find
those accountable, even though they remain elusive and have not
been brought to account. 53
How does blaming the government fit into this framework? The
core psychological argument is that people feel the need to find ac-
countable parties, and that this need is stronger when events are more
serious in their consequences. 54 People find it troubling to believe
that accidents with widespread and devastating consequences can oc-
cur without the negligence of someone. If people believe that some
party is responsible, they can then believe that the event could have
been controlled. Further, this need to hold someone accountable is
not linked only to events that people cause. It can involve judging
people negligent or responsible for failing to exercise due care to pre-
vent accidents or other unintended events. As human beings, we feel
uncomfortable believing that mass harms can occur by chance, and
that we are, therefore, powerless to defend against them. So, we seek
a way to view their occurrence, or at least the damage they cause, as
due to the failure of some person (or persons) to exercise due care. If
we believe this, we can feel that such events can be prevented in the
future. However, it is easier to have such a feeling if we are able to
point to a person or organization that "failed," making it clear how to
correct the errors that made the problem possible.
When disasters occur-whether the Challenger explosion, the sink-
ing of the Titanic or the Indianapolis, the attacks on Pearl Harbor, or
the September 11th attack-there is often an examination of why the
event occurred that can, at the extreme, even become an exercise in
scapegoating-holding a single person or persons responsible for
51. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 15.
52. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, LONGITUDES AND LATITUDES: EXPLORING THE WORLD AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11 (2002).
53. Id.
54. Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 73 (1966).
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events that were beyond their control or forseeability. 55 The com-
mander in charge during a military failure, or the head of an agency
unprepared for an emergency becomes the focus of the public's need
to identify and blame a responsible person. In this same way, we
propose that our anger after the September 11th tragedy has focused
on one person-Osama Bin Laden-whom we have been unable to
bring to account. Hence, people expand their range of potentially re-
sponsible people to include government officials and the airlines.
Showing that any of these people or. agencies could have prevented
the event provides the psychologically comforting feeling that such
events are not out of our control.
In situations in which there is evidence of negligence or irresponsi-
ble conduct, people react in moral terms to harm that results from
reckless conduct, or the failure to exercise due care, even when they
acknowledge that those in positions of responsibility did not intend to
cause harm.56 In other words, when harm results from errors within
organizations, or the lack of "adequate" safeguards, people are mor-
ally angered even though there is no evidence of intentional wrongdo-
ing. For example, no one suggests that the engineers at NASA
intended for the Challenger shuttle to explode, 57 but the general feel-
ing is that the engineers exercised too little caution and showed too
little concern for the safety of those who died. Similarly, when the oil
tanker, the Exxon Valdez, ran aground in Alaska, people did not feel
that Exxon intended to cause environmental harm by putting a cap-
tain with a history of alcoholism in charge of the ship. However, it
was felt that too little care was exercised in preventing such a mistake
from occurring.
In the case of the September 11th attacks, we suggest that the public
felt a need to establish whether the agencies of the government exer-
cised "due care." We argue that this need could best be addressed by
an effort to explore the causes of the event-by hearings or by some
form of investigation into what the government knew in advance, and
what it did to try to prevent the attack. Ironically, in March 2003, an
independent commission created by the President began holding hear-
ings about the causes of the attack.58 This is over one and one-half
55. Tom R. Tyler & Heather J. Smith, Social Justice and Social Movements, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 595 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1997).
56. Boeckmann, supra note 35.
57. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CUL-
TURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996).
58. The Commission was entitiled the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States. For information about the Commission and its hearings, see http://www.9-llcom-
mission.gov (last visited Nov. 11, 2003).
[Vol. 53:355
A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
years after the initial event. Hence, the government did not immedi-
ately provide people with any official way to identify and evaluate
evidence of government responsibility for the event.
Given that people need to have some type of moral accountability,
we argue that this failure to provide any forum for moral reckoning
created a psychological problem for the American public, and espe-
cially for victims' families. Psychologically, people want a moral ac-
counting, and money is not a substitute. By providing compensation
allowing a search for the "truth," the government provided a poor
substitute for what people wanted and needed. This situation created
the conditions under which people could easily feel that a "cover up"
was occurring, and that the money in the Fund was "hush money" to
buy silence and hide government irresponsibility and wrongdoing.
This is, of course, not to say that such beliefs are true-simply that
they are more likely to develop under particular conditions-and we
suggest that the Fund met many of those conditions.
F People Reject Putting a Monetary Value on Moral Harm
We began by suggesting that the key to understanding public reac-
tions to harm doing is to understand the moral and social implications
of harm. From this perspective, it is easy to see why the public often
views offers to materially compensate for harms to collective re-
sources and symbolic targets as failing to deal with the broader moral
dimensions of harm. People have difficulty regarding money as an
appropriate compensation for harm if that harm seems to have been
intended and, hence, reflects moral wrong. Attempting to compen-
sate for a moral wrong provokes anger and moral outrage. In other
words, "there is a strong taboo against using market pricing with re-
gard to entities that people regard as intrinsically belonging to the do-
main of communal sharing, '59 in this case, a common commitment to
the group and group rules, values, and institutions.
How do people evaluate the appropriate amount of compensation
for a moral harm? Our argument is that people reject such evalua-
tions, seeing such a question as inappropriate. In other words, when
you ask to buy my child and I say no, raising the price does not change
the situation; instead, it makes me angry. If people view a behavior as
morally wrong, they do not consider the costs and benefits associated
with that action, but are simply less willing to engage in that behavior.
59. Alan Page Fiske & Phillip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-offs: Reactions to Transactions that
Transgress the Spheres of Justice. 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 278 (1997).
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People do not trade-off moral values against the gains and costs asso-
ciated with such behavior.
In the case of harm resulting from an act of violence, these findings
suggest that people have trouble accepting compensation for immoral
actions.60 If people regard such harm as developing from bad motives,
they are unlikely to see compensation alone as an appropriate re-
sponse. Similarly, for many workers who develop cancers or other
occupational diseases from exposure to chemicals at work, many of
whom viewed their companies as negligent in their conduct and indif-
ferent toward employees, compensation is inadequate.61 Instead, they
want their day in court so that they can confront the company and
gain a public acknowledgment of the company's moral wrongdoing.62
If the company will not apologize, the company can be brought into
court and confronted with evidence of moral wrongdoing and con-
demned publicly by legal authorities, the victims, and members of the
public. 63
Because of the suggestions by many that some agencies in the gov-
ernment were negligent, or that the airlines were negligent, or both
were negligent, we suggest that the offer of compensation seems espe-
cially suspect when coupled with the failure to vigorously try to deter-
mine why the events occurred and who might be responsible.
Ironically, we argue that the government encouraged this line of
thinking when it set up the Fund and, thereby, suggested that some-
one felt the government or the airlines were in some way responsible
for the September 11th events.
G. Moral Accountability and Compensation
Our basic argument is that the September 11th tragedy is onethat is
not well-suited for a compensatory response. People would be much
better served psychologically by an effort to fully and completely air
issues of potential negligence and culpability. Absent such an effort,
compensation has the tone of trying to "buy people off" and "cover
up" the true issue-moral accountability.
We certainly do not want to suggest that the American government
is either necessarily responsible for the September 11th attack or that
it failed to respond adequately to the event after it occurred. Clearly
the government has made major efforts to deal with terrorism, includ-
60. Id.
61. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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ing our military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.64 However, the gov-
ernment did not respond openly to the desire of the families of victims
for a search for responsibility in the aftermath of the event. 65 We ar-
gue that such a search would have helped to mitigate bad feelings in
the wake of this tragedy. Further, such a search for answers could
have occurred in parallel to the operation of the Fund, which would
have minimized suggestions that the Fund was designed to buy the
silence of victims or "buy them off."
IV. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND COMPENSATION FOR HARM
Distributive justice is important. When people focus on material
compensation, their perspective is likely to be one of distributive jus-
tice. People will be as much, if not more, concerned about whether or
not they receive a fair amount as they are concerned about how much
they receive. The distributive justice focus is desirable because it facil-
itates the distribution of compensation across victims in ways that will
generally be viewed as satisfactory.
Authorities encourage a distributive fairness focus when they artic-
ulate a clear message about the fairness norms that are appropriate to
the situation. When people have a clear sense of the principles of
entitlement that ought to be applied, they are most likely to evaluate
their own outcomes in distributive justice terms.
The Fund does not encourage this distributive justice focus. It lacks
a clear, moral rationale and, as a result, the appropriate principles of
distributive justice are ambiguous. Government needs to establish a
clear principle of justice when it creates a program, and it needs to
articulate and "sell" that principle to the recipients and the public
more generally.
A. Distributive Justice
When compensation is a reasonable response to harm, the question
that must be addressed is: How much compensation is appropriate?
People need to feel that they received "enough" compensation for the
harms that occurred. When people receive compensation, they evalu-
ate that compensation, at least to some degree, through their sense of
general standards of entitlement or deservedness. People do not sim-
ply ask how much they have personally received, but also consider
whether things have come out fairly, such that their outcomes corre-
spond to broader standards about what is appropriate under the cir-
64. FRIEDMAN, supra note 52.
65. Meyerson, supra note 3, at 15.
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cumstances. 66 It is this non-self-interest aspect of distributive justice
judgments that is important because it provides a way to effectively
distribute scarce or contested resources.
The finding that people react to the fairness of the outcomes they
receive is widely replicated within the field of distributive justice re-
search. Literature shows that people are: 1) more satisfied when they
get what they deserve rather than when they receive "too much" or
"more than they deserve;" and 2) will leave a situation in which they
receive too much to go to a situation in which they receive lesser, but
"fairer," outcomes. 67 This finding is a promising one for those trying
to compensate for harm, as well as for those seeking to resolve dis-
putes over the distribution of scarce resources more generally. It sug-
gests that authorities can gain deference for compensation decisions
that give people less than they might want, if the resources are allo-
cated in ways that correspond to principles of distributive fairness. 68
B. Three Distributive Fairness Norms
A difficulty in trying to ensure that the recipients of compensation
feel that they have received a fair outcome lies in the availability of
multiple principles or standards people can potentially employ to
judge their deservedness. Three primary principles of distributive
fairness are often articulated: equity, equality, and need.69 Equity in-
volves the distribution of resources based on merit or productivity;
equality provides for equal distribution of resources across people;
and need involves giving more to those most in need.70
Within the United States, there is a general consensus that equity is
the appropriate policy to govern the distribution of rewards within
work settings. 71 Employees, therefore, typically accept differences in
pay that they think are linked to differences in skills, performance, or
market value. In political or community settings, people usually en-
dorse the principle of equality-equal rights under the law, "one per-
son, one vote. '72 Just as people resist the idea of equal pay,
irrespective of performance, they resist the idea of basing political
rights on ability or competence. For example, arguments that only the
"knowledgeable" should be allowed to vote are widely opposed. Fi-
66. WALSTER ET AL., supra note 28.
67. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25, at 45-74.
68. Id.
69. MORTON DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 38 (1985).
70. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25, at 45-74.
71. Tom R. Tyler, Justice in the PoliticalArena, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (Robert Folger ed..
1984).
72. Id.
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nally, within families there is general agreement that need is the key
principle governing allocation, and parents would not typically feel
that they should spend equal time with all children or, especially, that
the brightest children should receive more attention or resources. 73
Rather, they might think that the child with the most difficulties
should receive the most attention. There are differences in the degree
to which particular people hold these views, but studies suggest that
the three principles outlined generally dominate the areas mentioned,
at least within the United States. 74
The difficulty with the existence of at least three possible standards
of distributive fairness is that it invites people to interpret their situa-
tion in ways that bring principles more favorable to themselves to bear
on the issue of what is fair. So, highly skilled workers can view paying
by equity as fair, while the disadvantaged can see it as appropriate to
distribute resources via need. Multiple possible appropriate stan-
dards invite self-serving views of fairness. Such self-serving thinking is
not conscious or intentional, but it does cloud people's assessments of
fairness.
One of the important functions of society and of third-party author-
ities is to make it more difficult for people to engage in self-justifying
judgments. Society does so by clearly articulating standards of fair-
ness and, through those standards, (1) labeling the behavior of those
who harm others as wrong; and (2) clarifying what will make things
right. 75 Mediators and judges put moral force behind the argument
that particular standards represent fairness in a particular situation.
Victims would like for the harm that has been done to them to be
repaired but need a framework within which to understand what con-
stitutes a fair response to that harm. What is it reasonable to expect a
harm doer, or society, to do in response to the harm that has been
done? Victims are most likely to accept compensation when there
are principles that tell them how to evaluate the fairness of that com-
pensation, so that they can feel that they have balanced the scales of
justice in response to a particular harm.76
A third party authority can improve the likelihood that the victim
will be satisfied with some settlement involving compensation by
framing the problem in terms that make clear, both which principles
of distributive justice should apply, and what their implications are for
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. WALSTER ET AL., supra note 28, at 21-83.
76. Id.
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appropriate compensation. 77 When authorities clearly state the ethi-
cal framework that applies, that clear statement makes it more likely
that society and the victim will agree about appropriate compensa-
tion.7 8 This leads to a greater willingness to provide this compensa-
tion and increases the likelihood that victims will accept it and feel
satisfied. People are, in other words, motivated to balance the scales
of justice, but it is not always obvious how that can be done. Law and
legal authorities articulate the standards that tell people what fairness
means in a given situation so that they can feel that justice has been
done.
C. The Problem of Distributive Justice and the Victim
Compensation Fund
The Fund poses a twofold distributive justice problem. First, what
are the principles of justice that define who should receive compensa-
tion? For example, do the families of victims deserve any compensa-
tion at all from the government? Second, what distributive justice
principle should be employed to distribute money among those who
have been judged to be entitled? Both of these questions are essen-
tially policy questions that have to be answered and clearly explained
by authorities. How authorities reach each answer, and whether or
not each is explained to recipients of compensation, shapes people's
feelings of fairness and, thus, acceptance of the decisions made.
Regarding the first problem, Peter Schunck, from Yale Law School,
has been quoted in the New York Times, as saying: "It's impossible to
justify this money in terms of a defined system of justice. '79 Because
funds have not been provided for this purpose in response to prior
terrorist attacks, or in response to prior natural disasters, we argue
that it is not clear why justice is viewed as involving compensation of
this type in this situation.
This raises the question of how to draw the boundary around those
entitled to the "justice" of having their losses compensated. In other
words, we need to consider whether the range of events for which
people are compensated should be expanded beyond the victims of
the September 11th attacks to include victims of other foreign terror-
ist actions on American citizens and military, other domestic terrorist
actions such as the Oklahoma City bombing, or even other worthy or
noble deaths, such as people who have died while rescuing or trying to
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine) at 94.
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rescue others. Or perhaps criterion need to be narrowed to exclude
some or all of those currently in the Fund. Psychologists have talked
about this issue in terms of defining the scope of justice-the domain
of those entitled to the application of justice norms.80
Although defining the domain of those entitled to compensation is
not a key issue within the Fund, the establishment of the Fund, and
public dissatisfaction with it, are bound up in issues of inclusion and
exclusion. Victims of other disasters and terrorist acts have raised
questions about why they are excluded from compensation.81 In the
future, clearly defining the boundaries of compensation is likely to be
a major issue for government. It seems likely that future disasters or
terrorist acts will be followed by efforts to argue based upon principles
of distributive fairness that victims and their dependents are as enti-
tled to compensation as were those associated with the September
11th attack.
Within those "entitled," a class clearly defined by Congress in the
case of the September 11th attack, the question is which justice princi-
ples should apply: need, equality, equity, or others? In fact, if the
Fund was intended by Congress to replace the tort system and protect
the airlines from lawsuits, we would argue it should be viewed as an
alternative to the tort system. As a replacement for a tort lawsuit, we
might expect equity to apply, and to involve taking projected lifetime
earnings into account. So, the Fund takes into account "economic
losses" for "the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employ-
ment, medical expense loss, replacement-service loss, loss due to
death, burial costs and loss of business or employment opportuni-
ties."'8 2 In other words, the Fund might be viewed as compensating
for financial loss, as would occur in tort law.
However, there is a strong governmental aid aspect to the plan,
which is after all a government assistance program, suggesting the use
of the principle of equality (equal status and rights). When the Fund
seeks to compensate for noneconomic losses, such as emotional pain
and suffering, it is hard to see why one person's pain is worth more
than another's. We argue that not using equality seems to suggest that
the government views some lives as more valuable than others-a vio-
lation of the fundamental principle of communities that everyone is
equally entitled to status and rights, irrespective of economic position.
It is unclear how the government decides how much one person's life
is worth, and why one citizen is worth more than another citizen. (Or,
80. DEUTSCH, supra note 69, at 38.
81. Id.
82. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 1.
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for that matter, is a citizen worth more than a victim who is not a
citizen?)
It is this aspect of compensation that is normally minimized by man-
aging tort compensation through the legal system. In tort law, people
seek to compensate for financial damages, linking compensation to
the number and amount of damages.83 From that perspective, the
death of those who would have earned more is a more damaging
event-the loss is greater. Hence, from a tort perspective, not all
lives are worth the same, while from a political perspective, everyone
is equally entitled to government help.84
The disaster relief aspect of the plan also links it to another princi-
ple of distributive justice-need. In other words, the Fund is also a
social welfare fund. When agencies, such as the Red Cross, dispense
services following a disaster, for example, they typically provide food,
clothing, and shelter to those who are in need. There are a number of
social welfare funds, such as "welfare," supported by the government
to provide funds to various groups in our society who meet principles
of "need. '85 Like equity, this use of the need principle legitimizes the
unequal provision of resources across those impacted by the tragedy.8 6
However, in this case, the principle justifying unequal treatment is a
person's immediate need. A person whose house was destroyed in a
hurricane, for example, would receive shelter and food, while some-
one whose house was not destroyed would only receive food. We sug-
gest that viewing the Fund as "need-based relief" makes sense of the
provision that the donations people receive from private organizations
should be subtracted from their Fund settlements. Because part of
their needs have been met by charities, in other words, people should
receive lower levels of compensation from government.
Again, the potential applicability of different principles of distribu-
tive justice highlights the central point. Different approaches to those
victimized by disaster are linked to different principles of fairness. By
failing to articulate a clear principle of fairness by which it would op-
erate, the Fund invited people to interpret its goals in self-serving
ways. All that the law says about the purpose of the Fund is as fol-
lows: "It is the purpose of this title to provide compensation to any
individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically
injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
83. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
84. Id.
85. FAYE L. COOK, WHO SHOULD BE HELPED? (1979).
86. Id.
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September 11, 2001."1 7 This wording does not communicate what jus-
tice principle is the main motive behind the Fund and, thus, creates
the risk that people will interpret justice in a self-serving manner.
We argue that discontent with Mr. Feinberg, based on his manage-
ment of the Fund, could perhaps have been prevented had it been
clear from the start what the main distributive justice principle was
motivating the creation of the Fund.88 Further, this would have led
victims to be more satisfied with their own settlements, whether they
sued or not. The government, in other words, needed to establish and
publicly articulate the ethical framework out of which the Fund was to
operate. Unfortunately, we argue that it did not do so.
V. PROCEDURAL APPROACHES TO COMPENSATING FOR HARM
A. The Allocation Procedure (i.e., Procedural Justice) is Important
Receiving fair or even favorable compensation, and having some
type of moral accounting, are not the only issues that people care
about. People are also strongly affected by the fairness of the proce-
dure used to make allocation and culpability decisions.
Fair procedures are especially important when it is difficult to deter-
mine is an appropriate compensation for a loss, or when moral re-
sponsibility is unclear. In such a situation the only way people have to
estimate whether or not the outcome is appropriate is by judging how
that outcome was reached (i.e., the procedure).
The Fund lacks many of the procedural features that have been
shown to facilitate the willingness to accept decisions made by third-
party authorities:
(1) The manner in which the Fund was initially created lacked these
features, because there were no hearings or other forums in which
people could articulate their views about what type and level of com-
pensation was appropriate. People did not have the opportunity to
have input into creating the Fund and establishing its operating princi-
ples. Instead, Congress established the Fund in a short period of time
without public hearings, and the initial design of the plan did not call
for hearings involving the families of victims to discuss how compen-
sation should be determined.8 9
(2) The manner in which the Fund was to be implemented also
lacked features such as participation, transparency, and accountability,
87. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 1.
88. Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator: How Kenneth Feinberg Determines the Value of Three
Thousand Lives, NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 2002, at 42-49.
89. See September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 1.
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that are typically viewed as part of fair procedures. 90 Victims' families
were not entitled to hearings, nor were the rules of allocation clearly
stated. Further, there were no appeal mechanisms.91 Placing most of
the authority for implementation in the judgments of one person, no
matter how competent or well motivated, does not reflect procedural
justice. 92
The final psychological perspective on compensation for harm is
linked to a person's reactions to the procedures used when deciding
how to respond to harm. Here our concern is with efforts to respond
to harm by aiding the victims and their families. We want to distin-
guish this procedural issue from our earlier discussion of procedures
for finding the responsible parties for the September 11th tragedy.
While this section will focus on determining how to help victims, many
of the points we make also apply to the issue of appropriate proce-
dures for determining responsibility for events.
An extensive psychological literature on how legal authorities can
gain public acceptance for their decisions exists. 93 This research has
found that people focus their judgments on the procedures through
which compensation decisions are made. 94 In other words, people
judge the appropriateness of the outcome by assessing the fairness of
the procedures by which that outcome is produced. 95 This procedural
justice effect is distinct from people's reactions to the appropriateness
of the compensation outcome itself.96
The procedural justice effect is powerful and widespread. 97 It has
been found in studies of people's willingness to accept settlements in
cases of automobile accidents 98 and other civil suits.99 It has also been
found in studies of the willingness to accept the policies of regulatory
agencies,100 laws, and the decisions of police officers and judges.101
90. For a discussion of the elements of fair procedures, see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
91. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 1.
92. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 90. For an application to legal decision making, see TOM
R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
93. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 90; see also Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and
Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000).
94. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 90; see also Tyler, supra note 93, at 117-25.
95. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 90; see also Tyler, supra note 93, at 117-25.
96. Tyler, supra note 93, at 117-25; see also Tyler & Smith, supra note 55, at 595-629.
97. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25.
98. ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE
NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988).
99. E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fair-
ness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 224 (1993).
100. Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in a Social Dilemma Situation, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 482 (1995).
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Across a variety of settings, the fairness of decision-making proce-
dures shapes reactions to decisions.
B. Weighting Procedures Over Outcomes
Evidence supporting the importance of procedural justice is found
in the literature examining the circumstances under which people
choose to go to court to seek redress for an injury caused by others, or
to overturn a decision made by a judicial authority.1 02 The traditional
argument is that people seek redress when they think they are likely
to be successful. This argument explains people's claiming decisions
as rational cost benefit calculations.103 Interestingly, recent research
does not support this instrumental perspective on claiming. E. Allen
Lind, J. Greenberg, K.S. Scott, and T.D. Welchans, for example, inter-
viewed employees recently terminated by their companies who filed a
formal claim because of the termination. 10 4 Their analysis showed
that estimates of the likelihood of winning had only a small influence
on claiming, as did the magnitude of the financial hardship caused by
termination. 10 5 Moral responsibility for the termination-whether it
was viewed by the employee as due to his or her own work failures or
to unfair actions by management-had no significant influence on
claiming.106 Strikingly, employees were most strongly influenced in
their claiming decisions by their judgments of the fairness or unfair-
ness of the termination procedures. 107
Robert J. Bies and Tom R. Tyler conducted a similar, but less exten-
sive, study using a smaller sample of employees. 0 8 At the time of the
study, the employees were working for their company, but had a re-
cent experience with management about which they might want to file
a claim.10 9 An examination of correlations indicated that employees
were slightly more likely to consider claiming when they thought they
might win (r = .09) and when they felt that the decision against which
101. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERA-
TION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
102. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
103. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, and Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-1981).
104. E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from Employee to Complainant: Situational and
Psychological Determinants of Wrongful Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557 (2000).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Robert J. Bies & Tom R Tyler, The Litigation Mentality in Organizations: A Test of Alter-
native Psychological Explanations, 4 ORG. SCi. 352 (1993).
109. Id.
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they are reacting had been an unfair one (r = .28).110 However, there
was a stronger connection between whether they considered claiming
and whether they thought the decision-making procedures were unfair
(r = .46), whether they felt that they were not treated with respect
during the decision-making procedures (r = .45), and whether they did
not trust the motives of management (r = .37). 11
These findings suggest the importance of making decisions in ways
that people will view as fair.112 In the studies above, people's evalua-
tions of the fairness of the procedures used to make decisions shaped
their claiming behavior.11 3 If people were fired or laid-off, but the
procedure involved was a fair one, their likelihood of suing was low.
This was true even if they felt that they would win the suit.
Other studies suggest that procedural fairness also shapes the will-
ingness to accept decisions and to follow rules," 4 and influences eval-
uations of authorities and institutions, commitment to organizations,
and a variety of other important social behaviors.1 15 The repeated
demonstration that people are concerned about the fairness of the
procedures by which outcomes are determined, not just what those
outcomes are, has several implications. 116
For example, in cases concerning widespread worker exposure to
asbestos, liability for a particular person's injuries is sometimes deter-
mined without a hearing, using answers to a questionnaire regarding
exposure to asbestos. The courts use this approach to distribute set-
tlements to large groups of victims quickly. However, instead of
gratefully receiving their rapid settlements, injured parties have been
angered by the denial of their "day in court." In other words, an ef-
fort by the judicial system to reform in order to better meet the needs
of the public has not been successful due to an inaccurate understand-
ing of what people really want in this situation.11 7
The importance of procedural fairness may seem surprising. This is
the case because current thinking about people's satisfaction is largely
shaped by the belief that people are motivated primarily by self-inter-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
113. See Lind et al., supra note 104, at 557-90; see also Bies & Tyler, supra note 108, at 352-66.
114. TYLER, supra note 92.
115. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 Ao-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legiti-
macy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court
and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
116. Tyler, supra note 27, at 199-205.
117. Id.
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est.1 18 It is believed, as a consequence, that people are unhappy when
they fail to receive favorable outcomes. In the case of taking claims to
the courts, for example, it has been assumed that people are discon-
tented when they receive unfavorable verdicts or settlements, when
court costs are too high, or when delays in litigation are too long.
These assumptions are typical of those which develop from what so-
cial psychologists have labeled the "myth of self-interest"-the belief
that people are basically motivated by personal gains and losses.11 9
The results of studies of the public suggest that the basis of people's
actual reactions differs substantially from that which would be pre-
dicted by this "self-interested" image of the person. 120
C. When Do Procedures Matter?
Sometimes the cost of harm is easy to estimate. For example, peo-
ple may have hospital bills or know the exact amount of income they
have lost. However, the degree of subjective harm is often more am-
biguous. For example, how much harm is involved in the "pain and
suffering" associated with an illness? Or what is the amount of harm
caused by the loss of an arm or of a life? In such situations, estimates
of the equitable amount of compensation for an injury are very sub-
jective and, therefore, a social judgment. As is true with evaluations
of responsibility for an injury, such judgments are shaped by social
values dictating which standards of fairness are applicable and by fac-
tors that shape the nature of the subjective comparisons people
make.121. Hence, people are influenced by the manner in which the
problem is framed. The fairness of a decision-making procedure is
especially relevant when it is difficult to determine what is an appro-
priate compensation for a loss because the only way people have to
estimate whether or not their outcome is fair is by judging how that
outcome was reached.
Procedures are also important when there are differences among
people regarding the "value" of the harm to the victim. In this situa-
tion, people may have a clear sense of how much harm has occurred,
but people differ in their estimates of the value of the harm. Such
situations are likely to occur when people's views are influenced by
their diverse ideologies and social values. Fair and agreed upon pro-
cedures can also help to satisfy different groups of people who have
118. Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-interest, in CURRENT
SOCIETAL CONCERNS ABOUT JUSTICE (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1996).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25, at 14-42.
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varying opinions on what kind of ideology the compensation should
be based on-need, equity, or equality, as discussed above.
Psychological research further suggests the particular types of pro-
cedures that will enhance the acceptance of decisions. 122 One exam-
ple is the use of mediation. While legal authorities have criticized
informal legal procedures such as mediation, these procedures have
been found by psychologists to be very popular among disputants. In
fact, civil case mediation has been found to produce a greater willing-
ness to accept decisions than formal trials. 123 Why? Because these
procedures are judged to be fair by people who see the opportunity to
participate in decisions regarding their own welfare. 124
D. The Meaning of Procedural Fairness
The key to understanding how to design effective procedures is to
understand what people mean by a "fair" procedure. Studies suggest
that four elements of procedures usually influence judgments about
fairness.125 First, whether procedures allow people an opportunity to
state their case; second, whether authorities are viewed as neutral (i.e.,
unbiased), honest, and principled in their decision-making; third,
whether the authorities involved are seen as benevolent and caring
(i.e., are "trustworthy"); 126 and fourth, whether the people involved
are treated with dignity and respect. 127
1. Voice/Participation
People seek fair solutions to problems involving harm. In order for
decision-makers to determine what is fair, they need to have as much
information as possible about the nature of the harm that has been
done. Further, they need to know the concerns of the victims. Vic-
tims believe that a fair procedure should allow them as much opportu-
nity as possible to present evidence about the nature of the harm they
have suffered and their views about what should be done. For victims
to have input, they must be given a chance to participate in the pro-
cess of deciding how to resolve the harm. In the area of criminal jus-
tice, for example, it has been found that victims regard criminal
procedures as much fairer when they are allowed to participate by
122. LIND & TYLER, supra note 90.
123. Rosselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of
Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & Soc'y REV. 323 (1995).
124. LIND &TYLER, supra note 90.
125. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens To Assess the Fair-
ness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 103 (1988).
126. LIND & TYLER, supra note 90.
127. Tyler, supra note 125, at 301.
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describing their experiences and by making arguments about what
should be done with the offender. 128
2. Neutrality
People recognize that social rules are designed to ensure that all
members of society receive reasonable levels of outcomes over time.
When dealing with social authorities, people seek evidence that they
are not disadvantaged relative to others. For authorities to be viewed
as fair, they need to demonstrate evenhandedness or impartiality.
They can do so by equal treatment of all; by not allowing their per-
sonal values or relationships to influence their actions, and by using
objective criteria as a basis for their opinions. All of these actions
assure the people who deal with authorities that their decisions are
reasonable and ought to be accepted.
3. The Trustworthiness of Authorities
Studies suggest that people are very concerned about their infer-
ences concerning the motives of the authorities responsible for finding
appropriate ways to deal with harm. If victims feel that the authorities
care about their needs and concerns, and are trying to find fair ways to
deal with the harm that has been done, they are much more willing to
accept a wide variety of solutions to that harm. 129
4. Treatment with Dignity and Respect
One consequence of doing harm to others is to diminish their status
within their own eyes and to raise questions about their status in soci-
ety.130 A central function of procedures enacted following victimiza-
tion is to help restore the status of the victim.1 31 This is done through
treatment with dignity and respect. Research suggests that people
value respectful treatment by authorities, which enhances their feel-
ings about themselves and their position within society. Conversely,
social authorities may seek to diminish the status of harm doers. The
judge may, for example, publicly condemn the behavior of a harm
doer. Social authorities may take on the role of labeling behavior as
morally wrong and shameful to make up for the unwillingness of harm
doers to apologize and act contrite. When harm doers refuse to ac-
128. Id.
129. Peter Degoey & Tom R. Tyler, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Mo-
tive Attributions on Williness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 331 (Roderick
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
130. TYLER ET AL., supra note 25, at 181-206.
131. Id.
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knowledge the wrongness of their own conduct, social authorities can
take on the role of condemning their behavior in the name of
society.132
E. Implications for the Fund
Procedural justice can be expected to play an especially big role in
the case of the Fund. As was noted above, people typically have little
basis for objectively determining the correct or appropriate compen-
sation for harms. Hence, they will depend heavily on their evaluations
of the procedures used by authorities to make such determinations.
This is especially true in the case of an event without prior precedent
like the September 11th tragedy. If not unique, the events of Septem-
ber l1th were hardly typical, so there is little basis for people to draw
on when seeking to develop feelings of entitlement. And, as we have
noted, there are multiple principles of justice upon which people
might draw. Finally, it is a situation that is very ideological, so there
may be differences about what is appropriate or reasonable. 133
In the case of the attacks of September 11th, the issue of compensa-
tion is literally without precedent. As a result, neither legislators nor
victims were able to look to prior situations to make an initial deter-
mination of how much compensation was appropriate. As discussed
in the section on distributive justice, Congress did not solve this mat-
ter by clarifying on what distributive justice rules compensation
should be based. Hence, it is going to be very difficult for benefi-
ciaries of the Fund to look at their compensation offer and determine
whether justice has been done. As a result, people will estimate the
fairness of the Fund by looking at the procedures used to distribute
the money.
As we noted above, research has shown that a key element of estab-
lishing perceptions about the fairness of procedure is allowing people
to have input into the process. 134 People want to be able to express
their views about what should be done in response to harm, and one
way they can do so is by being given the chance to state their prefer-
ences for how to resolve the issues posed by the harm. To maximize
the value people place on the opportunity to have input, government
officials should focus upon several features of the procedure given,
132. Id. at 103-32.
133. See Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Proce-
dures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 809 (1994); see also Tom R. Tyler,
Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens To Defer To Law And To Legal Authorities, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 983 (2000).
134. Tyler, supra note 125. at 301-55.
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which can enhance people's feeling that they have experienced a fair
procedure. The key from the perspective of gaining acceptance for
decisions is that people need to feel that their views were listened to
and considered. How can this be done?
First, by allowing people to provide input in their own words. Peo-
ple prefer to have the opportunity to structure their own arguments
when making a presentation.1 35 This goes against the basic form of
filling out standardized forms and applications. A traditional way of
addressing this issue is authorities holding town-hall meetings and ask-
ing for people's opinions regarding major decisions pending in the
community.136
Second, by providing feedback that indicates people's preferences
were considered and taken into account. This does not mean that
people need to feel they have made the decisions. But people do need
to feel that their views have been actively considered. Authorities can
facilitate such feelings by accounting for their decisions in the respon-
dent's own terms. Hence, they can explain what the respondent's ar-
guments are, how they were considered, and why they could or could
not be utilized. It is important to emphasize that such explanations
are not simply an opportunity for the decision-makers to explain their
reasons for their actions. It is also important to show that the respon-
dent's arguments were carefully considered and, if not used, were re-
jected on reasonable grounds.
People also want to believe that those authorities with whom they
are dealing are neutral and factual in their decision-making. For this
reason, evidence of bias or favoritism has very negative implications
for judgments about the fairness of decision-making procedures. 137
Authorities typically use transparency-openness about what the rules
are and how they are applied-to make clear that neutrality exists.
Further, people want to be treated with dignity and respect and
have their rights acknowledged and respected. 138 This involves both
interpersonal respect during personal experiences with authorities,
and a broader acknowledgement by authorities that people have
rights needing respect.
Finally, they want to believe that those authorities with whom they
are dealing are benevolent and caring.' 39 People want to have trust
and confidence in authorities, believe that the authorities have benev-
135. LIND & TYLER, supra note 90.
136. Tyler, supra note 93, at 117.
137. LIND & TYLER, supra note 90.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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olent motives, and understand that the authorities are concerned
about the needs of those they serve.
As far as we can see, none of the aforementioned ways of creating
perceptions of procedural fairness were utilized when the Fund was
initially established. The working principle was for the authority in-
volved (a Special Master) to be generous in amounts of compensation
and swift in distributing them.140 Calculations were almost exclusively
based on tables incorporating age, salary, and marital status of the
victim.14 1 Beneficiaries of the Fund were never asked for input and
did not get the opportunity to express their feelings, or argue for what
they felt was an appropriate compensation for their loved ones.142 As
a result, there was minimal public input.
People's need for such "voice" became apparent in news reporting
that people were including all sorts of memorabilia about their rela-
tives with their completed standardized application to the Fund, even
though this information was not relevant to compensation.1 43 People
had no input in deciding how and on what distributive rules the Fund
should operate; as a result, the second principle of establishing proce-
dural fairness, providing feedback to people about how their concerns
were being addressed, could not be fulfilled.
Further, relatives of single and high-earning victims have also ques-
tioned the principle of neutral and factual treatment and have raised
concerns about the motivations of the Special Master. 144 Giving such
a large amount of discretionary authority to the Special Master, who
need not account for or explain how he made decisions, has led to a
vagueness concerning the rules that would govern allocations, and
raised the suspicion that biases and personal preferences will shape
the allocation decisions made. Lacking clear procedures that create
transparent decisions, and working in a system in which the Special
Master need not explain or account for decisions; mistrust seems
inevitable.
It is interesting to compare the creation of the Fund to the decision-
making process for rebuilding the World Trade Center site. Even
though it might not be entirely fair to compare the sentimental issue
of compensating for lives to that of deciding on building plans, the two
140. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, supra note 1.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. David W. Chen, Families Personalize 9/11 Aid Forms; Testimonial, Victims Offered
Alongside Cold Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at Bi.
144. Jonathan Eig, Litigation Brief Affixing the Blame for September 11 Loss: A Widow's
Choice, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at Al.
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have many things in common. Both are related to the terrorist at-
tacks, are very emotion laden, and involve large amounts of money-a
lot of it coming from public funds.
The process of deciding on the building plans for the World Trade
Center site has been very open to the public. It has been taken in
several steps and has allowed for input by the public along the way.
For example, all interested parties were invited early in the process to
come to a large public meeting at which they could communicate their
views about the future of the World Trade Center site. This large pub-
lic meeting produced many new ideas and it was made clear that the
planners considered and, in some cases, adopted these ideas. In addi-
tion, it did a great deal to calm public concerns. People saw that their
concerns were listened to and addressed in the planning process; they
felt included and involved. In comparison to the Fund, the building
site controversy has faded from public attention, and people seem,
generally, much more accepting of government efforts to plan future
uses for the site.
There are two points at which the public might have had more input
into Fund decisions. First, in the design of the Fund itself-here the
public had basically no role in shaping the compensation rules or
other aspects of the Fund. Many of the problems that developed as a
result of the Fund could have potentially been identified and rectified
at this initial stage if a procedure, more like the World Trade Center
siting procedure, was initially used.
Second, the public could have had more input in individual compen-
sation decisions. Initially, the Fund lacked transparency, because it
had no clear rules about how funding decisions would be made. In
this case, Mr. Feinberg has made numerous accommodations to this
public desire by the implementation of the vague procedures origi-
nally created for the Fund, allowing people to have multiple meetings
with hearing officers, and considering material people they viewed as
relevant to the compensation decision. In other words, in its imple-
mentation, the Fund has evolved to include more attention to issues of
process.
Of course, the degree to which public input is important is also
linked to our prior discussion of the principles by which the Fund will
operate. One advantage of equality as a decision rule is that it does
not involve as much need for input. 45 If each person, for example,
received one million dollars, the money could be dispensed with atten-
tion only to determining who deserved it. However, both equity and
145. David M. Messick, Equality, Fairness, and Social Conflict, 8 Soc. JusT. RES. 153 (1995).
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need require individualized determinations of compensation, and
hence, invite the desire to have input into the decisions being made. It
is for just such a reason that it is often argued that equality is the
decision rule that can be most easily implemented in these types of
settings.146
F. Conclusions About Satisfaction
Our analysis leads to three suggestions to better manage satisfaction
with the compensation funds following events similar to the Septem-
ber 11th attack, if and when they occur in the future. First, it is impor-
tant to articulate clearly what the operating distributive principles are
behind the Fund. This is something Congress or the executive branch
has to articulate; it involves explaining why the Fund is being created,
and the principles of morality or justice that it is supposed to re-
present. These lead to principles of justice that will govern both the
range of recipients and the principles establishing the amounts of
compensation that they receive.
Second, people want to feel that the Fund is making decisions using
fair procedures. They need opportunities for input into the design of
the compensation scheme and, within that scheme, opportunities to
discuss their individual needs and concerns with decision-makers.
Studies make very clear that people are not primarily interested in the
swift delivery of monetary compensation. They seek and find more
satisfying procedures that provide them more opportunity for input at
all stages. In recent days, more families of victims have met with the
Special Master of the Fund, and there are suggestions that these meet-
ings have helped to mitigate negative feelings. 147
Finally, it is important to recognize the need for people to be in-
volved in some form of moral accounting. Unlike prior major trage-
dies and disasters, there was no highly public "fact-finding" following
the September 11th attack. As a result, people never had an opportu-
nity to work through their feelings about possible government negli-
gence or inadequacy, nor did they have the chance to examine any
possible responsibility of the airlines, the Saudi Arabian government,
or other actors. In addition, the direct harm doers were dead by their
own deed, and their superiors have been frustratingly difficult to find
and put on trial. Hence, people have had little chance for a moral
146. See id. This point has been most clearly articulated by David Messick.
147. Kenneth Feinberg, Comments at the Clifford Symposium at DePaul College University
of Law (Apr. 25, 2003).
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reckoning. The strong desire that people feel to have such a reckon-
ing should be incorporated into responses to such events.
G. Why Should We Care About Public Dissatisfaction?
When discussing the Fund, much of the focus of attention has been
on public dissatisfaction. We think this misses the larger perspective
against which the Fund, like any government program or policy, might
be viewed. That perspective is how it influences or shapes the rela-
tionship that members of the public have with the government. In this
case there are two potentially relevant groups: the families of the vic-
tims and the public, more generally.
In both cases, the broader "civics" argument is the same. The gov-
ernment depends heavily on voluntary cooperation from citizens.1 48
We want citizens to willingly obey the law,' 49 help police fight crime
and terrorism, 150 be willing to assume duties, such as fighting in
wars,15 1 and paying taxes, 152 and generally be engaged in their com-
munities and in the political process.1 53 All of these behaviors are
shaped by public views about the legitimacy of government and of its
policies and actions.
Hence, the effectiveness of legal authorities, law, and government
depends upon the widespread belief among its citizens that it is legiti-
mate and entitled to be obeyed. 154 Given this important set of public
beliefs, we need to understand how public views about legitimacy-
public "trust and confidence"-are created and maintained. If we un-
derstand the conditions under which supportive public values, such as
legitimacy, play an important role in shaping public views, we can un-
derstand how to build a law-abiding society in which people take the
148. Tom R. Tyler, Leadership and Cooperation in Groups, 45 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 769 (2002).
149. TYLER, supra note 92.
150. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shap-
ing Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513 (2003).
151. MARGARET LEVI, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM (1997).
152. John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to
Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 398 (1998); see also John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty,
Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 490
(1995).
153. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN IT-
ALY (1993).
154. This argument is not confined to legal authorities. Similar findings emerge when we
study the behavior of employees in work settings. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate with
Organizations: An Identity-Based Perspective, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
(Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton eds., 1999); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERA-
TION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT
(2000).
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personal responsibility and obligation to be good citizens onto
themselves. 155
One factor that influences legitimacy is public reaction to govern-
ment policies, leading the impact of such policies on public views
about government to be a key concern in the long-term effort to cre-
ate and maintain public support for the law, legal authorities and insti-
tutions, and for the government more generally. While we have
outlined three potentially important issues-moral accountability, dis-
tributive justice, and procedural justice-each of which might influ-
ence public views about the legitimacy of the government, studies
consistently find that the key antecedent of assessments of the legiti-
macy of government-whether Congress, the United States Supreme
Court, the policy, or the law-is judgments about the fairness of the
procedures the government uses to exercise governmental
authority.156
For example, while both distributive and procedural justice are
found to shape people's satisfaction with their outcomes when they
are dealing with legal authorities, 157 it is the procedural justice of gov-
ernment actions that generalizes to shape views about law and govern-
ment.15 8 Hence, when it makes policies, the government needs to be
sensitive not only to the objective quality of those policies, but also to
how their creation and implementation is viewed by the public.
The importance of procedural justice among those with personal ex-
periences with legal authorities is illustrated in the study of Tom R.
Tyler and Yuen Huo. 159 This study explored the factors shaping peo-
ple's willingness to accept decisions made by police officers and judges
during personal encounters in which those being interviewed had been
involved. The study found that both the people's judgments that au-
thorities behaved in procedurally fair ways, and acted out of trustwor-
thy motives, strongly shaped their willingness to accept the decisions
made, as well as their evaluations of the authorities involved. Both
procedural justice and trust, in turn, were shaped by evaluations of the
quality of decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment.
Of the two, it is the quality of interpersonal treatment that is found to
155. Tom R. Tyler & John Darley, Building a Law-abiding Society: Taking Public Views About
Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive
Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707 (2000).
156. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 115, at 703.
157. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 483
(1988).
158. Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of
Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 629 (1989).
159. TYLER & Huo, supra note 101.
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be the most important. These findings are consistent with prior proce-
dural justice results, and support the argument that people's reactions
to their personal experiences with legal authorities are primarily a re-
action to the procedures by which those authorities exercise their
authority.
In the case of the larger public, studies of how the public generally
evaluates legal institutions suggest a very similar conclusion. 160 Peo-
ple focus on their views about how the courts and the police exercise
their authority-whether they make decisions in fair ways and
whether they treat people respectfully. Hence, again, the implica-
tions of the Fund for the general public are likely to flow out of the
way people view the Fund's exercise of its authority.
The need to be viewed as exercising authority fairly is especially
important in situations in which people are suspicious about the gov-
ernment and its leaders. We live in an era of generally low trust in
government. 61 Further, it is clear from the public comments made
about the Fund that people were broadly skeptical about the motives
of government authorities, and about their possible negligence in the
original attack on the World Trade Center. Hence, there was both
general mistrust and mistrust about the particular event at issue.
Under these circumstances, as we have already outlined, it is espe-
cially crucial that the government address issues of trust and credibil-
ity, as well as manage the immediate problem being handled. To do
so, the government needs not only to be fair, but to be seen as being
fair. This involves using transparent procedures for creating and im-
plementing the compensation funds.
In this instance, the government lost an opportunity to build public
support for the law and the government, in addition to resolving the
immediate issue of compensating victims. With the families of the vic-
tims, the Special Master has been making efforts to manage these is-
sues by adding procedural elements to his implementation of the
Fund, as we have already noted. These efforts will, no doubt, mitigate
some of the negative feelings among those who choose to participate.
Those who choose not to participate may be too mistrustful and
suspicious to be brought into the Fund at this time. This is the group
that might have been brought in had the government used procedures,
160. Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 215
(2001).
161. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspecitive on
Civil Procedure Return, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 869 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law:
A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847 (1998).
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such as those used in the case of World Trade Center siting "commu-
nity meetings," to involve them in the initial decisions about how the
Fund should be constituted. For this group, the opportunity to
strengthen allegiance to law and government may have disappeared.
Finally, for the public more generally, the creation and implementa-
tion of the Fund is more abstract. But, like many other public events,
it shapes people's orientation toward government and their civic be-
havior. How is the Fund likely to shape those views? Primarily
through the image of procedural fairness that the Fund communicates.
In the case of legal authorities, for example, it is clear that those who
observe what they view as unfair procedures on the part of legal au-
thorities, procedures such as harassment or profiling, view law and
government as less legitimate, even when those procedures do not im-
pact them personally. 162 For example, the views of white citizens
about the extent of racial profiling are strongly linked to judgments
about the legitimacy of the law and of legal authorities, as are the
views of minority citizens, even though white citizens do not think that
they are the targets of profiling.163 People view government as less
legitimate when they view it as engaging in unfair procedures, even
when those procedures are directed at other citizens or groups of citi-
zens and do not involve them or the members of their own ethnic
group.164
Underlying our policy analysis is the view that government depends
upon the good will and "buy in" of most of the members of the com-
munity most of the time. This means that government authorities
must be sensitive to the appearance of fairness, as well as to its reality.
It needs to create and implement public policies, whether the Septem-
ber 11th Compensation Fund or police stops, with an awareness of
how the public views those policies. Based upon empirical research, it
is clear that the public is very ethical in evaluating authorities-judg-
ing them against criteria of fairness. In particular, the public is very
sensitive to its assessment of whether the authorities are exercising
their authority in ways that are fair. Such procedural justice judg-
ments shape the legitimacy of the authorities in the eyes of citizens,
and influence whether people cooperate with authorities.
The entire era in which we are living, of course, is a long "emer-
gency," as we battle terrorism at home and abroad. Is it the case that
162. See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and the Legitimacy of the Police 42 CRIMI-
NOLOGY (forthcoming 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Department of Psychol-
ogy, New York University).
163. Id.
164. Id.
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these special circumstances change the dynamics of the relationship
between citizens and the state? We would argue that, in these troub-
led times, the government is, more than ever, dependent on the good
will and cooperation of its citizens, who are being asked to endure
hardships and face risks as we battle to defeat terrorism.
In particular, terrorism depends for its success on finding support
and safe havens within communities in the general population. The
government needs the active cooperation of the members of these vul-
nerable, and potentially stigmatized, minority groups to identify and
capture terrorists. Hence, it is more important than ever that all citi-
zens, whatever their background and history in America, feel loyal
toward American society and its institutions. We would suggest that
this is a time when the government must both be and be seen to be
exercising authority fairly.
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